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Borneo Herald
10.16am MYT, 30-11-2025
WARISAN didn’t “lose badly” – it actually won the popular vote and came second in seats – but it lost the post-election numbers game and was out-manoeuvred in coalition formation. The failure to become government is less about voter rejection and more about (1) seat distribution vs popular vote, (2) fragmentation of Sabah’s party system, and (3) how fast and tightly the other side closed ranks around Datuk Hajiji Noor.
I’ll break it into three layers: what happened, what the numbers really say about Warisan’s performance, and why that still didn’t translate into government
1. What actually happened on 29–30 November
Official result (DUN Sabah, 73 seats) – EC figures
From the Election Commission announcement and major media:
• GRS – 29 seats
• Warisan – 25 seats
• BN – 6
• Independents – 5
• UPKO – 2
• Sabah STAR – 2
• PH – 1
• PN – 1
• KDM – 1 
A simple majority is 37.
Turnout ended up around 64%, with about 1.15 million voters casting ballots. 
On government formation:
• In the early hours of 30 November, GRS formed a bloc with UPKO, PH and five Independents, totalling 37 seats, just enough for a simple majority.
• Hajiji was sworn in around 3.05am as Chief Minister for a second term on that basis. 
• Warisan, with 25 seats, could not assemble an alternative majority in time, despite being the second-largest bloc.
So the formal reason Warisan is not the government is straightforward: it did not command 37 seats; GRS + allies did. But that’s only the surface.
2. What the numbers say about Warisan’s performance
If you look beyond the seat count, the picture is more nuanced.
2.1 Popular vote vs seat count
The Star’s interactive breakdown (and EC data quoted there) shows:
• Warisan popular vote: 288,703
• GRS popular vote: 286,389
Warisan actually edges GRS in total votes, even if only slightly. 
So:
• Warisan = stronger in raw support than the seat tally suggests.
• But under first-past-the-post, where you win or lose – and your margins – matter more than aggregate votes.
2.2 Urban surge, rural limits
Media coverage describes a kind of “local tsunami”:
• Warisan swept most urban & Chinese-majority seats, taking traditional DAP and PKR strongholds like Luyang, Likas, Kapayan and other city seats. DAP was wiped out in all eight seats it contested, often losing directly to Warisan candidates. 
• Warisan also scored some symbolic wins against big names (e.g. Salleh Said Keruak’s Usukan defeat, Bahanda family losses in the Rungus belt). 
• But GRS remained dominant or competitive in many Malay/Muslim-Bumiputera and KDM rural seats, and its allies plus Independents stitched together enough interior/rural representation to complement GRS’s own 29 seats. 
In short: Warisan’s vote is more concentrated in urban and mixed areas, which gives big raw totals but fewer distinct DUN wins compared with GRS’s more spread-out rural/heartland reach.
2.3 Hyper-fragmentation and five-corner fights
The election was extremely crowded:
• 596 candidates for 73 seats, including 74 independents. 
• Many constituencies saw five-corner or more contests, especially where local parties (KDM, STAR, UPKO), national coalitions (BN, PH, PN) and independents all jumped in. 
In that environment:
• Warisan’s decision to contest all 73 seats alone, while consistent with its “Sabahans for Sabah” narrative, also meant its vote was spread thin, and in many places it faced both GRS and some other Sabahan party or independent competing for similar anti-incumbent / “local party” sentiment. 
• Conversely, GRS could benefit from vote-splitting among its opponents, especially where Warisan, BN, PN, KDM and others all split the anti-GRS or “change” vote four or five ways.
Result: Warisan’s seat count under-represents its underlying support, but the system rewards who converts fragmented votes into first place in enough seats – and that was still GRS.
3. So why didn’t Warisan become the government?
Now to the heart of your question: if Warisan had strong support and 25 seats, why isn’t it running the state?
3.1 Coalition arithmetic and speed
The cold math:
• Warisan: 25
• Majority needed: 37
The plausible post-election routes on paper would have needed some mix of:
• BN (6)
• STAR (2)
• KDM (1)
• Some or all of the 5 Independents
• Possibly UPKO (2) or PH (1), if they were willing to break from GRS-aligned arrangements
What actually happened instead:
• GRS clinched a deal first: 29 (GRS) + 2 (UPKO) + 1 (PH) + 5 (Independents) = 37, just enough to cross the line. 
• Malay Mail explicitly notes that while Warisan “came close to being the best negotiation force” with around 25 seats, it “could not form a coalition soon enough”, while GRS moved quickly to lock in potential partners. 
In other words:
Warisan didn’t lose government at the ballot box alone; it lost it in the first few hours of post-poll negotiations.
Speed, pre-existing understandings, and the tendency of independents and small parties to align with the incumbent CM for perceived “stability” all favoured Hajiji.
3.2 Structural alliance disadvantages
Several structural factors reduced Warisan’s coalition options compared to GRS:
1. GRS–PH understanding and federal linkages
• Even before polling, GRS was already in a governing arrangement with PH at the state level, itself tied into the Datuk Anwar Ibrahim-led unity government at the federal level. 
• PH’s single seat and UPKO’s eventual alignment with GRS made sense in that bigger national picture; crossing over to Warisan would mean repudiating that federal/state alignment.
2. Warisan’s “no pre-poll pact” stance
• Warisan publicly ruled out pre-poll coalitions, insisting on contesting all 73 seats under its banner, stressing stability through a single Sabah party rather than fragile coalitions. 
• That position is ideologically consistent, but it also meant fewer pre-agreed partners ready to move within hours of the result. When no one has pledged to govern with you beforehand, you must negotiate from scratch on a very tight clock while your rival is already halfway there.
3. Independents with prior GRS ties
• Some of the successful independents (e.g. Datuk Fairuz Rendan in Pintasan, Datuk Maijol Mahap in Bandau) had previous connections to GRS or GRS-friendly parties and were seen as “hedged backups” for the GRS-PH side. 
• That made them structurally more likely to fall in with Hajiji than with an opposition-led alternative.
Put simply: even though Warisan had the numbers to theoretically build a rival 37-seat coalition, the pool of realistically available partners was much smaller, and GRS closed those doors very quickly.
3.3 Narrative battlefield: stability vs change – and who “failed more”
CNA and other coverage leading up to the poll summarised the core narratives:
• GRS frame:
“We are the stable government focused on development and unity; Sabah needs continuity, not a return to those who previously failed.” Hajiji repeatedly hammered the “don’t give a second chance to those who already had power” line, aimed squarely at Warisan’s 2018–20 stint. 
• Warisan frame:
“Sabahans must free Sabah from both GRS’s failures and over-dependence on KL-based coalitions; Sabah for Sabahans, Selamatkan Sabah” – attacking GRS on water, electricity, roads, and the 40% revenue issue, and presenting Warisan as the authentic Sabah-first vehicle. 
On 29 November, the electorate basically said:
• “We agree with state-based parties and Sabah-first politics” – GRS and Warisan together dominated, while PH, BN and especially DAP were punished. 
• But they did not give either GRS or Warisan a clear mandate; instead, they produced a hung DUN and forced bargaining.
In that bargaining space, the “stability” narrative helped Hajiji more than the “reset” narrative helped Warisan. Small parties and independents, many of whom campaigned on local development and patronage, logically gravitated to the sitting CM who could promise continuity of projects and access to federal funds.
3.4 Youth, digital campaigning and geography
A couple of deeper structural points:
• Youth vote share: Roughly 54% of Sabah voters are 18–39, thanks to Undi18 and automatic registration. 
• Digital campaigning was much heavier this time, especially by opposition forces highlighting water, electricity and corruption. 
Warisan appears to have benefited significantly among urban youth and online-active voters, which explains the heavy swing in city seats and the strong overall popular vote.
But:
• Youth populations are concentrated in urban and peri-urban areas, which Warisan largely won already.
• Many rural seats with older and more dispersed electorates remain less impacted by digital campaigns and more anchored to local networks, state apparatus and existing incumbents.
Thus, Warisan’s strengths (urban, youth, online) translated into big margins where it was already competitive, but didn’t crack enough of the remaining rural seats to overtake GRS in total DUNs.
4. Pulling it together
So, answering your question directly:
Why did Warisan fail to become the State Government in PRN-17?
Because:
1. Seat vs vote mismatch:
Warisan’s vote was strong – arguably stronger than GRS in raw numbers – but concentrated in urban seats and five-corner fights. That produced 25 seats instead of 29+, even though the popular vote was slightly higher. 
2. Hung assembly and coalition disadvantage:
With no party at 37, everything depended on alliances. GRS already had a structural alignment with PH and quickly secured UPKO and key Independents, hitting 37 first. Warisan, despite being numerically in contention, could not assemble an alternative bloc fast enough, and some of the most likely partners (UPKO, PH-linked forces, ex-GRS independents) were never realistically available. 
3. Perceptions of stability among kingmakers:
Among BN, independents and smaller parties, Hajiji embodied continuity of office, federal linkages and control over state machinery, while Warisan represented a full reset. In a hung situation with multiple moving parts, key actors chose stability – even if voters themselves had sent a mixed, protest-heavy signal.
4. Geography and generational profile:
Warisan’s urban and youth-weighted base responded strongly to its Sabah-first, anti-corruption and “Selamatkan Sabah” themes, but that base is not yet distributed in a way that delivers 37 seats, especially in KDM and East Coast rural belts where multiple Sabahan parties and independents split the field. 
If you strip away the drama, PRN-17 says this:
• Warisan did not collapse; it repositioned itself as a powerful urban/younger-voter force and the largest single opposition bloc.
• But GRS still controlled the hinge points – incumbency, early coalition engineering, and the loyalties of smaller parties and independents – and that’s why Hajiji, not Warisan, walked into Istana Seri Kinabalu at 3am.#~Borneo Herald™
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